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Abstract 
The issue of quality has been extensively discussed in Interpreting Studies (IS). Quality 
is subjective, ineffable and cultural. As the “aspiring-to-science community” (hereafter 
“ATSC”1) defines “scientific” as empirical, quantifiable and objective2, it is bound to strug-
gle when dealing with such a concept. Yet, precisely because it stipulates that a scientific 
approach requires a quantifiable dimension, it has to try and define quality in an ob-
jective manner. Shackled by its postulates, the ATSC has drawn upon two approaches 
that have predictably come short. One vainly seeks to define quality and subsequently 
“objective and quantifiable” criteria to assess it. The other claims to draw on marketing 
and strives to measure user satisfaction, primarily through questionnaires. The most 
advanced work in marketing, however, has taken on board the findings of cognitive 
*  I would like to dedicate this paper to one of my dearest friends, Alain Bonzon, who 
passed away not so long ago and happened to be an intensive Simultaneous Interpre-
tation user. May he rest in peace.
1  I will use Gile’s convoluted description in this paper although I would prefer the word 
“positivists”.
2  A similar statement is unsurprisingly inscribed on the front of the Social Science 
Research Building at the University of Chicago. Frank Knight, the excellent albeit 
underestimated economist, is said to have remarked on it one day: “Yes, and when you 
can express it in numbers your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind!” 
(McClosky 1983: 482).
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psychology and behavioural economics and rejects questionnaires as a reliable source 
of information about customers’ thoughts and emotions. Moreover, IS questionnaires 
usually postulate clear-cut distinctions between such norms as fidelity to meaning and 
performance-related criteria. Quality is frequently restricted to performance in the booth 
although this could lead to significant problems being overlooked. Lastly, the ATSC 
might be stifling promising research approaches and projects because of its excessively 
restrictive criteria. 
Introduction
Daniel Gile (1990a: 233) has argued that “a very important question which has 
never been studied in depth is the nature of interpretation quality” and called 
for research to look at how interpreters and delegates define quality. Eleven years 
later, he was still writing that “[a]ssessing quality in interpretation, as well as 
translation, evidently is a major issue, both at a professional as well as an educa-
tional level” (Gile 2001: 379). In fact, any discussion of expertise and professional 
performance requires shedding light on the concept of quality. Can “objective” 
criteria be defined? Or is there an intangible aspect that is subjective, because the 
rapport between interpreters and audience plays a crucial role? We have all expe-
rienced cases where users have praised our performance even though we know 
all too well that it was far from flawless and sometimes actually accumulated 
mistakes. In other words, what did the users like? If we know that we made nu-
merous mistakes when interpreting names and figures, clearly we cannot hope 
to define quality by assessing our performance according to such criteria. I would 
argue that we are moving into a far more slippery area, where the users’ reaction 
may very well depend on “subjective” factors such as the confidence conveyed by 
the interpreter’s voice as well as the impression projected by the interpreter of 
being interested in the subject, and so forth. 
The ATSC’s determination to assess quality in interpretation and translation 
has to be understood in the light of their definition of “scientific”. Just as we need 
to define as precisely as possible a kilogramme, a metre or a litre in order to be 
able to make measurements, the rationale here is that, since we need to be able 
to quantify data when carrying out research, we must rely on an “objective and 
quantifiable” criterion, in other words quality. Afterwards, supposedly, we will be 
able to conduct tests to gauge the efficiency of, say, an approach in teaching as re-
flected by an improvement or deterioration in quality. Similarly, Gile (1990c: 29) 
has argued that scientific work is based on “facts collected through systematic 
observation, carefully checked and assessed”, to be contrasted with unscientific 
research based on “facts encountered in daily, personal and subjective experi-
ence”. His dichotomy is founded on the simplistic idea that facts exist objectively 
and simply wait for researchers to identify them. Such a pre-Kuhnian viewpoint 
stems from the inclusion of “empirical” in the definition of “scientific”. Here, we 
could draw on E.H. Carr’s (1961: 23) famous metaphor when discussing such a 
viewpoint in history:
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[...] facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger’s slab. They are like fish swim-
ming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian ca-
tches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses 
to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use – these two factors being, of course, deter-
mined by the kind of fish he wants to catch. By and large, the historian will get the kind 
of facts he wants. 
I apologise for insisting on the fact that the ATSC definition of “scientific” is so 
restrictive but, as we shall see, this plays a crucial role in the debate and accounts 
for otherwise contradictory and inconsistent statements. An additional reason 
why quality has been widely discussed in IS is that we conference interpreters 
claim we deserve to be paid similar rates to those of highly qualified profession-
als and therefore need to justify such a demand. Any such research in IS therefore 
needs to be above suspicion like Caesar’s wife in order to pre-empt accusations of 
manipulating findings3. 
The foregoing leads to a paradox. Some twenty years ago, Gile hailed the fact that 
what he calls the aspiring-to-science community “has taken the lion’s share both in 
recent publications and in conference participation” (Gile 1995a: 15). The reasons 
for its success were evident in his opinion: “In concrete terms, [ATSC scholars]:
 − systematically conduct empirical testing of their ideas and theories;
 − systematically provide evidence to back up claims;
 − are explicit about their materials, methods and factual and/or logical 
grounds for their claims;
 − make a clear distinction between documented facts and speculative 
thoughts” (Gile, 2004a).
Notwithstanding, although the changeover to a “scientific” approach could have 
been expected to result in major advances in the study of quality, the lack of any 
significant progress is striking. Kahane (2000) concedes that there is no con-
sensus on “the elusive concept of quality; quality for whom, assessed in what 
manner?”. Collados Aís and her team (2007: 224) conclude their book by quoting 
Cartellieri’s words from 1983: “Much still remains to be done to overcome the 
present unsatisfactory state of affairs in the sphere of reliable quality parame-
ters”. In fact, such concepts as Quality or Beauty are ineffable, cultural and sub-
jective. Seeking to define Quality “objectively” hardly makes more sense than 
trying to paint the wind. ASTC researchers have attempted to muddy the waters 
by talking about quality per se when they are clearly referring to a definition that 
necessarily includes a subjective dimension or about quality defined as equiva-
lent to user satisfaction. In other words, the ASTC approach dooms research to a 
dead-end because of the flaws and shortcomings of its methodology.
3  I hasten to say that Gile is exemplary in terms of tackling head on the fact that research 
findings may be inconclusive or suggest that some of the claims made by interpreters 
are not justified. His willingness to discuss research that apparently undermines 
some long-standing beliefs and viewpoints in the interpreting community is highly 
commendable.
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In my opinion, the fundamental fallacy of the ATSC is the conviction that “sci-
entific” means objective, quantifiable and empirical. Anything in Interpreting 
Research that cannot be quantified is rejected into the purgatory of the “Liberal 
Arts Paradigm”. More fundamentally, although the ATSC portrays itself as scien-
tific and objective, relying exclusively on solidly demonstrated evidence, its pro-
ponents repeatedly indulge in sweeping assertions that lack any basis whatever 
but seek to project the image of self-evident statements of fact. For instance, Gile 
(1995a: 20) writes:
Most interpreters and interpretation teachers with academic degrees in fields other 
than translation or interpretation are graduates of foreign languages and/or cultures 
(sic) departments. Only a few practi-searchers have a solid background in an established 
scientific discipline such as linguistics or psychology [...] (my italics)
On what grounds can Gile argue that linguistics and psychology are “established 
scientific disciplines”? Psychology was dominated for far too long by behaviour-
ism, a school that incidentally also argued that its methodology was empirical, 
quantifiable and objective. Would Gile argue that sociolinguistics is scientific? 
Would he claim that Chomsky’s transformational generative grammar is undis-
puted and undisputable science? Likewise, Gile (2009: 144) writes: “scientific lit-
erature (...) depends less on rhetoric4 and more on strict, systematic, cautious, logical, 
objective use of data [than academic literature of the liberal arts type]” (my italics). 
To which it could be retorted that the ATSC resembles Molière’s Monsieur Jour-
dain who was astonished to learn that he had been speaking prose all his life: the 
ATSC apparently has been using rhetorical devices without being aware of it. 
Take the habit of speaking about oneself or one’s work in the third person. 
McClosky (1990: 32-33) explains how “[t]he suppression of the “I” in scientific 
writing is more significant than one might think. […] The scientist says: It is not 
I the scientist who makes these assertions but reality itself”. He adds that the 
underlying idea is that “[…] scientific texts are transparent, a matter of “mere 
communication”, […], simply “writing up ‘theoretical results’ and ‘empirical find-
ings’ (ibid. 36-37)”. Not all scientists feel the need to abide by such a convention 
with everything it entails. Indeed, Watson and Crick’s landmark paper begins: 
“We wish to suggest a structure for the salt of deoxyribose nucleic acid (D.N. A.)” 
(1953: 737). 
By contrast, ATSC researchers have repeatedly used the third person to make 
unjustifiable value judgements as if they were perfectly bland and self-evident. 
For instance, Gile has argued that “most interpreters are humanities- or lan-
guage faculty graduates with no scientific training and expertise, and they find 
less motivation in the long, somewhat arid efforts actual research implies in terms of 
data collection, analysis and tests of precise hypotheses than in free theorization” 
(my italics). Moser-Mercer (1994: 17) divides the IS community into followers 
of the “natural science paradigm”, where research requires “precision of logi-
cal processes” and a “liberal arts community” that is content with “explorations 
which involve the intellect in a less logically rigorous manner” (my italics). These two 
4  Here, Gile is using a rather negative and limited definition of the word “rhetoric”.
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statements hardly fit Gile’s description of ATSC members’ “reluctance to specu-
late […] without the support of evidence for every step they take” (Gile 2004b): 
126). Amazingly, he rejects Pöchhacker’s description (2004: 109) of Moser-Mer-
cer’s statement above as “divisive” and disingenuously adds “until Pöchhacker 
presents evidence or at least a strong rationale to support this view, I should like 
to suggest the opposite”5. In other words, Gile seems to be saying that as Mos-
er-Mercer is merely describing reality, i.e. the fact that the liberal arts community 
is content with explorations that are less taxing intellectually, who could object? 
Likewise, Gile has also asserted that “questionnaires have been the most com-
mon means to determine user expectations and/or responses, as they are the 
most straightforward scientific way of collecting data on actual quality percep-
tion by delegates” (Gile 1991: 193-4). Kurz (2001: 397) has repeated this argument 
verbatim while referring to Gile’s assertion. Neither writer provides the slightest 
shred of evidence to back up such a controversial claim (I would personally argue 
that a more compelling argument could be made in favour of participant obser-
vation) — although Gile defines the need to give references to “back statements 
which require them” as a “fundamental criterion for scientific quality” (1999a: 
33). Another rhetorical device used at times consists in sprinkling a text with 
mathematical symbols even when this does not clarify the meaning of the text or 
provide any meaningful contribution to the argument. This list is obviously not 
exhaustive. The reader will find more examples of subjective (and even at times 
glaringly wrong) statements made by ATSC members masquerading as obvious 
statements of fact in the rest of this article. 
1.  Am I measuring quality or user satisfaction?
Some researchers have designed surveys targeting interpreters and not users. 
Such questionnaires seek to determine the importance of various components of 
quality in the opinion of interpreters. In particular, Chiaro and Nocella (2005: 177) 
contended that “a genuine delegate is likely to be hard put to be able to judge the 
fidelity of an interpreted speech with the original” and therefore sent their ques-
tionnaire to interpreters. Gile has repeatedly questioned the ability of users to as-
sess interpretation quality criteria. In all likelihood, this is indeed frequently the 
case and delegates often lack any such expertise. Notwithstanding, the vast major-
ity of users do assess, when filling in a questionnaire, the quality of interpretation. 
As Kahane (2000) points out, Gile throughout his extensive body of work has 
been tireless in advocating the need for objective, quantifiable criteria. At the same 
time, Gile has repeatedly highlighted the problems encountered with respect to 
5 Ironically, Gile (2004 ibid) then writes: “I should like to suggest that a fundamental 
difference between followers of the ‘natural science paradigm’ and followers of a 
‘humanities-inspired paradigm’ (or whatever other names one might like to give 
them) is that the former tend to stay much closer to evidence in their inferences than 
the latter, for whom it is legitimate to interpret and extrapolate without necessarily 
having to justify every one of their assertions.” Bear in mind that Moser-Mercer does 
not provide any evidence at all to back her somewhat contentious statement. 
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the subjective nature of assessment6. In fact, how could a consensus ever emerge 
on quality assessment guidelines? Grbić (2008: 234) states the obvious when she 
writes that “quality is not intrinsic to an object”. Luccarelli and Gree (2007: 2544) 
illustrate this point: 
In 1996, the Private Market Sector invited an expert on quality control systems to a 
meeting in Lisbon to explore the possibility of AIIC or its members applying for ISO 
quality certification (...). Our quality control expert recognized the difficulty of the 
task. Quality would be difficult to control in conference interpreting precisely because 
it depends on so many factors beyond the interpreter. Listeners may very well form 
different impressions and give different evaluations. In other words, he deemed that a 
degree of subjectivity was unavoidable.
To give just one example, we sometimes adapt our output to the people listening 
to us when we know enough about them. I regularly interpret at a three-day man-
agement seminar held by a CAC 40 company. Twice, a former French rugby star 
was the guest speaker. The first time I was working for two Britons and an Amer-
ican who had all played rugby (the American amazingly had been a long-standing 
member of the US national team). The second time, I was interpreting for a Ger-
man, a Dutchman and a Pole and safely assumed they knew virtually nothing, if 
anything, about the sport.
If I had been taped and the quality of my two versions had been assessed, the 
obvious and “objective” conclusion would have been that I made far more errors 
and omissions the second time around. If I had been taped only the second time, 
my rating would have been quite low. I can remember one specific example be-
cause a colleague asked me at the time how I had translated “on ne va pas faire 
pleuvoir des chandelles”. The first time I translated “we’re not going to kick up-and-
unders all day” (trust me: that is one way of rendering what it means in English) 
and the second time “we’re not going to play negative rugby”. The first time I 
peppered my interpretation with rugby-specific jargon, the second time I made 
numerous omissions and actually “mistranslated” quite a few words while add-
ing information the speaker had not given. 
Likewise, Peter Mead (2005: 40) describes a study of how seven interpreting 
teachers at Italian and Austrian universities were asked to assess interpretations 
by five students:
 
Lack of consistency between the various assessments indicates considerable variability 
in standards and priorities from one assessor to another. It was emblematic, for exam-
ple, that there was unanimity about awarding a pass or a fail for only three out of ten 
interpretations. Another interesting finding was that almost none of the seven asses-
sors could generally be identified as a consistently higher (or lower) marker than others.
Any criticism on the grounds that the sample is too small statistically can easi-
ly be dismissed: extensive research in docimology has shown the subjective di-
mension of evaluation. This holds true in such subjects as mathematics as well 
6  See Gile 1990b: 195 for instance. In particular, in this article Gile explores a wide range 
of reasons that rule out the idea of ever defining objective assessment criteria.
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as physics. One examiner will fail a student who made a calculation error at the 
very outset and accordingly every other calculation was wrong, whereas another 
one will give the same student an excellent grade because she deems a silly mis-
take in an otherwise faultless demonstration relatively unimportant. Quality is 
by definition a subjective and multidimensional concept. 
I will not discuss in depth Gile’s “scientific” definition of interpretation qual-
ity as: 
[...] a subjectively weighted sum of a number of components: the fidelity of the tar-
get-language speech, the quality of the interpreter’s linguistic output, the quality of 
his or her voice, the prosodic characteristics of his or her delivery, the quality of his 
or her terminological usage, all of them as perceived by the assessor” (Gile 1995b: 151) (my 
italics). 
He has even included a mathematical formula (Q = S wi ci) where ci stands for 
the quality components and wi for their relative weightings (ibid). He fails to 
explain, however, how these mathematical symbols enhance his explanation or 
how his approach can be reconciled with the inclusion of subjective components 
in his definition. 
In sum, we are to build a rocket in order to explore a planet called Quality – 
although nobody has the slightest idea where the planet is to be found. Robert 
M. Pirsig in 1974 in his cult novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance 
summed up everything that can be said in this respect: even though Quality can-
not be defined, you know what Quality is, in your opinion, when you see/hear/ 
taste/read it7. The main character ends up on the verge of insanity because of his 
obsessive attempt to nail down the concept.
Another approach has been widely followed. Instead of pursuing the Holy 
Grail of defining quality, other researchers have sought to measure user satisfac-
tion. Grbić (ibid: 236) has pointed out that several interpreting scholars explicit-
ly refer to marketing and management studies, in particular Total Quality Man-
agement and Quality Assurance. An interesting point is that the main thinkers 
in these fields, the likes of Juran and Deming for instance, never define Quality 
– they simply measure the cost of failing to provide it. Citing Kotler and Arm-
strong8, Kurz (2001: 394) nonetheless asserts: 
[…] quality must begin with customer needs and end with customer perception. There 
is no reason why this generally accepted marketing principle should not apply to con-
ference interpreting as well
More accurately, it could be said that this principle is “generally accepted” among 
marketing apologists. Such an approach is blatantly functionalist. If quality is 
achieved by meeting or exceeding customer expectations, my children’s subjec-
tive assessment of the quality of Big Mac hamburgers, i.e. outstanding, has to be 
7  I would like to thank Tomás de la Guardia for reminding me of this book and making 
many other insightful suggestions.
8  Actually, this is a textbook for undergraduates. 
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endorsed. Hunger and thirst are physiological needs, but a craving for a Big Mac 
and a can of Coke is a want stimulated by massive advertising, which has resulted 
in a severe child obesity problem in many countries. How could Kotler’s defini-
tion be of any use in terms of evaluating quality in interpreting?
The fundamental assumption accepted by nearly all IS researchers who be-
lieve quality reflects user satisfaction has been voiced, as said above, by Daniel 
Gile: “Questionnaires (...) are the most straightforward scientific way of collect-
ing data on actual quality perception by delegates” (Gile 1991: 193-4) (my italics). 
Note that Chiaro and Nocella (2004) made a compelling case that most ques-
tionnaire-based quality research carried out in Interpreting Studies suffers from 
severe methodological flaws in terms of statistical methodology. Interestingly, 
in their original article they stated that “[w]e would like to approach the issue 
of quality from the angle of economics, bearing in mind that interpreting is a 
service [...]” (2004: 280). In their answer to Pöchhacker, they (2005: 177) wrote 
“judging the quality of an interpretation is quite different from that of judging 
a regular marketable good. (We suggest that those convinced by our argument 
skip the rest of this section and move on to 3.2)”. I beg to differ and strongly 
recommend not skipping the following part because it is illuminating:
A housewife asked to judge the quality of a pot of jam, for example, has a range of 
tangible and highly perceptible characteristics upon which to base her evaluation. The 
colour of the jam, how much it costs, it’s (sic) shelf life, nutritional information on the 
label, packaging and, last but not least, it’s (sic) flavour. 
Several ideas spring to mind. First, a sleight of hand is obvious: we have moved 
from “the angle of economics”, and a “scientific” approach buttressed by statisti-
cal concepts such as sum of the scores, non-comparative scales and chi squared 
testing to ... what could be best described as a naïve view of marketing. Second, 
the housewife (the authors’ choice of word) they describe is a femina oeconomica 
who makes rational choices based on objective criteria and is fully aware of the 
reasons why she makes these choices. 
Whatever economic woman may say when answering a survey, her choice 
is influenced by a myriad of factors she is unaware of. For instance, retailers use 
colours: red dominates at McDonald’s because it causes you to eat more quickly, 
freeing up room for the next customer. Supermarkets are now using specialised 
scent machines wafting the smell of fresh baked bread and other scents because 
shoppers will spend more when smelling them. The best slots on shelves are at 
adult eye-level, and that is where relatively expensive products are put, often to 
the right of popular items (to increase the chances that right-handed shoppers 
will pick them up). The fresh fruit and vegetables section is systematically posi-
tioned next to the entry. As The Economist (18 December 2008: “The way the brain 
buys”) points out: 
For shoppers, this makes no sense. Fruit and vegetables can be easily damaged, so they 
should be bought at the end, not the beginning, of a shopping trip. But [...] selecting 
good wholesome fresh food is an uplifting way to start shopping, and it makes people 
feel less guilty about reaching for the stodgy stuff later on 
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In fact, the unreliability of surveys in terms of “reflecting” consumers’ feelings 
and, above all predicting subsequent actions, has been obvious for many mar-
keting professionals for a long time. In the 1950s, for instance, Ernest Dichter9 
and the Motivation Research school eschewed empirical marketing research and 
polling in favour of in-depth interviews and small panels. Robert Peterson (1992: 
49) suggested in the 1990s that: 
customer satisfaction ratings may well reflect the Hawthorne effect: Attempts to 
measure customer satisfaction will, in and of themselves, serendipitously increase 
satisfaction, regardless of the product or service being investigated.
Vavra (1997: 29) reported that “60% of all defecting customers were either ex-
tremely or very satisfied according to CSM data”10. American marketing specialist 
Jack Trout (2008: 42) pointed out that 89% of people who owned cars of a certain 
make said they were very satisfied and 67% said that they intended to purchase 
another car from that company. A follow-up study found that fewer than 20% ac-
tually did so. As Ogilvy Group UK vice chairman Rory Sutherland in Tarran (2011: 
passim) states: 
No-one in any research group would ever say, “If there are four brands of shampoo, 
I’ll buy the one that has most bottles on the shelf”, or “I’ll choose the one that’s on the 
third shelf up because it’s the one that doesn’t require much reaching down” or “I’ll 
look at the prices of three products and choose the one in the middle.” In reality, we use 
heuristics and shortcuts and cognitively miserliness like this all the time.
Philip Graves (2010: 91-2) shows that the original estimate of consultants Deloitte 
& Touch projected that 12 million people would visit the Millennium Dome in 
London in 12 months. Advertising agency M&C Saatchi’s subsequent review ar-
gued, on the basis of surveys, that 12 million was a “conservative” figure. In fact, 
only 6.5 million visitors came — a disastrous shortfall. They failed to come despite 
what they had said when questioned about their intentions. 
In fact, more and more companies and researchers agree that watching con-
sumers behave is far more relevant than listening to what they say when asked 
questions. By the way, any teacher worth her grain of salt knows that asking pu-
pils/students whether they have understood something is senseless. Not only 
will they feel reluctant to confess they do not understand something more than 
once from time to time, but also all too frequently they will sincerely and mis-
takenly answer in the affirmative. Graves (2010: 92-3) makes a telling point of 
obvious relevance for the issues discussed in this article:
Concern about the quality of research tends to be focused on the validity of the sample 
and the statistical significance of any differences in the data, but [...] the methodology 
can be pure and the results still grossly misleading.
9  He is credited with the concepts of focus groups and brand images.
10  CSM stands for Customer Satisfaction Management.
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He carries on to describe in depth the flaws in surveys, focus groups and ques-
tionnaires used in marketing but his crucial point is as follows: “[.. ] over recent 
decades, a growing body of scientific evidence has revealed something that is 
both fascinating and somewhat disarming. We don’t think in the way we think 
we do” (ibid: x)11. Sutherland spells out the logical conclusion that “survey research 
is an inherently unreliable means of getting to the truth of consumer behaviour 
and emotions.” For him (Tarran 2011) at the very most, “it’s still better than igno-
rance in many cases”.
2.  Seventy times seven skins12
Cognitive psychology sheds light on the process with its “dual-process” model 
of the brain. According to Daniel Kahneman, who won the “Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics” in 2002, we use two fundamentally different modes of thought: “Sys-
tem 113” and “System 2”. In his riveting book “Thinking Fast and Slow”, he writes 
that System 1 “operates automatically and quickly with little or no effort and no 
sense of voluntary control” while System 2 “allocates attention to the effortful 
mental activities that demand it, including complex computations” (Kahneman 
2012: 20). He argues that System 1 is sensitive to subtle environmental cues, e.g. 
instantaneously detecting hostility in a voice, and enables us to carry out every-
day activities, such as driving a car, without needing to focus on them and so 
forth. However, this system is terrible at the sort of statistical thinking required 
to make complex choices, jumps to wild conclusions and uses irrelevant men-
tal shortcuts or heuristics14 and is prey to all sorts of illogical biases. System 2 is 
the conscious being we call “I” and mistakenly think it decides our choices and 
actions. System 1 is really the one in charge as it “effortlessly originates impres-
sions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate 
choices of System 2” (Kahneman ibid: 20-21). Most of the time System 1 runs au-
11 The foregoing accounts for the emergence of neuromarketing and its techniques 
that range from measuring facial expression, skin conductance and pupil dilation to 
measures of brain activation (cf. Knutson et al. (2007 : 147-56); Senior C. and Lee N. 
(2008 : 263-271); and Ariely D. and Berns G.S. (2010 : 284-92). Likewise, the following 
articles highlight the shortcomings of traditional marketing tools and approaches: 
Chartrand et al. (2008 : 189-201; Fitzsimons G.J. et al. (2002 : 269-279. Another 
promising, albeit highly controversial, approach is provided by Big Data, with the 
focus put once more on how consumers actually behave. 
12 Nietzsche, 1: “(...) how can man “know himself”? He is a thing obscure and veiled: if the 
hare have seven skins, man can cast from him seventy times seven, and yet will not be 
able to say “Here art thou in very truth; this is outer shell no more.” 
13 Wilson (2003) calls it the “adaptive unconscious” but Kahneman wanted a complete 
break from Freud.
14  Typified by the following example: “How many animals of each kind did Moses take 
into the ark?” The number of people who detect what is wrong with this question is so 
small that it has been dubbed the “Moses illusion” (Kahneman 2012: 73). By contrast, a 
very high percentage of respondents in a QCM survey in the United States answered 
the question “Who was Joan of Ark?” by ticking the “Noah’s wife” box.
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tomatically and System 2 is in a comfortable low-effort mode in the background. 
System 2 is a supporting character who believes him/herself to be the lead actor 
and often has little idea of what is actually going on.
The fundamental consequence of the dual-process model was summed up by 
Kahneman (2012: 52) as follows: “The notion that we have limited access to the 
workings of our minds is difficult to accept because, naturally, it is alien to our 
experience, but is true: you know far less about yourself than you feel you do”. 
Wilson (2003: 52) reports that our five senses are taking in eleven million piec-
es of information every second but at the very most we can process consciously 
around 40 pieces of information. Accepting that human beings are often una-
ware of why they acted in a given manner, or believe in blatantly false explana-
tions as to why they did, is a crucial step. We cannot expect such self-knowledge 
to be directly accessible by researchers. Actually, this explains why positivism 
fails in social sciences. 
Economist Dan Ariely’s book Predictably Irrational (2008) in which he explores, 
inter alia, the conflict between social and market norms has a revealing sub-title 
“The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions”. Studies in this field highlight the 
astonishing extent to which we are influenced by arbitrary and apparently un-
related factors. The consequences can be dramatic. Kahneman (2012: 43-44) de-
scribes a study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Eight 
judges considering parole applications on average approved 35% of requests. The 
authors of the study plotted the portion of approved requests against the time 
since the last food break (morning break, lunch and afternoon break). It spiked 
after each meal at around 65% and then declined steadily during the two hours or 
so until the following break, sinking to about zero just before the next meal. 
3.  I can’t get no satisfaction 
The marketing industry was all the more fascinated by such findings as it was 
already aware of the problems encountered in surveys. In 1997 Vavra (1997: 71) 
came to the conclusion that:
One of the insights in assessing customer satisfaction was the understanding that quality 
(as delivered in our products and services) is not an objective thing to be measured by 
conformance to engineering or design specifications. Rather, that quality (as primary de-
terminant of satisfaction) is, frustrating as it may be to engineers and technicians, a very subjec-
tive concept, depending substantially on individually-derived cues and other soft data. 
So the first learning for a satisfaction professional is to never assume he or she knows 
exactly what the customer is looking for, or how the customer defines quality. (my italics) 
Some twenty years ago, Robert Peterson (1992: 71) had complained that “indeed, 
examination of the satisfaction literature inevitably culminates in a pervasive 
yet inescapable conclusion -- it is not clear what customer satisfaction ratings are 
measuring (my italics).”
This very point was in fact raised by Cattaruzza and Mack in 1995 in their 
survey of simultaneous interpretation users, based on Vuorikoski’s date quality 
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criteria, since they asked: “Are we sure we were all talking about the same thing?”. 
Diriker (2011 passim) reports that her “semi-structured interviews with users of 
SI at a philosophy conference (...) hint at the fact that there is not a common and 
objective understanding regarding quality criteria [...]”. In her book, she drove 
home this point: 
[...] although the respondents seemed to be referring to the “same” quality criteria that 
were also used by some user surveys (such as “fidelity to the original meaning”, “cor-
rect terminology”, “grammaticality”, “fluency”), there were significant differences not 
only in how users of SI rated various quality criteria, but also in how individuals defined 
the criteria. (Diriker 2004: 80) 
Unfortunately, the use of surveys runs into many other pitfalls than the straight-
forward fact that respondents understand key words in different manners. 
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk” by Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, published in the prestigious Econometrica journal in 1979, is one 
of the most frequently cited articles in social sciences. It showed that alterna-
tive decision frames produce systematic changes in responses and choices and 
even reversals in judgments, despite the fact that the frames are equivalent. For 
instance, large changes of preferences are sometimes caused by inconsequen-
tial variations in the wording of a questionnaire. Likewise, Ofir and Simonson 
(2001) have shown that forewarning customers prior to service consumption 
that they will be asked to assess quality afterwards leads customers to report less 
favourable quality evaluations and reduces their willingness to purchase and rec-
ommend the service. This is due to ‘‘negativity enhancement’’, i.e. forewarned 
consumers tend to focus primarily on negative aspects of service experiences. 
Research in marketing has also shown that significant differences, of around 
10-12%, in satisfaction ratings are found between a questionnaire administered 
orally and a self-administered one, as well as between telephone interviews and 
those obtained through mail (drawing on “a large, nationally representative 
sample in excess of 5,000 new car buyers”) (Peterson 1992: 70). Bruine de Bruine 
(2010: 21) writes that:
[…] on written surveys, options that appear near the beginning of the list are more likely to 
be selected. [...] It appears that earlier options receive more cognitive processing, with 
respondents presumably thinking of more reasons for selecting them [...]. Possibly, 
respondents assume that earlier options are more important to the researchers. 
Likewise, the ratings respondents can choose will exert an influence; e.g. wheth-
er the option to tick “No opinion” is provided. Such effects apply to all surveys. 
We now need to look at problems encountered in questionnaires that specifically 
ask respondents to look back at the last day(s) during which they have been lis-
tening to interpreters and judge their performance.
At this point, Kahneman’s “peak-end rule” is highly relevant. He argues that 
when we look back at a past experience and evaluate it there is a discrepancy be-
tween the “experiencing self” and the “reflective self.” We would not be surprised 
if a friend were to tell us that they were at the opera the night before and had a 
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fantastic time until the end when somebody’s cell phone went off and rang noisily 
for what seemed an eternity. We would not tick if our friend said that incident had 
ruined the whole performance. In fact, her memory of the evening may have been 
ruined but she actually spent hours in musical bliss. Her “reflective self” however 
is confusing experience with the memory of it, which “ [...] is a compelling cog-
nitive illusion – and it is the substitution that makes us believe a past experience 
can be ruined. The experiencing self does not have a voice” (Kahneman 2012: 381). 
Kahneman (ibid: 388) conducted experiments that confirmed his intuition. “In 
intuitive evaluation of entire lives as well as brief episodes, peaks and ends mat-
ter, but duration does not.” Therefore, when delegates fill in a questionnaire at the 
end of a conference, their reflecting selves are relying on their memory of how the 
interpreters performed, as determined by the moments when their level of sat-
isfaction (hopefully) peaked and their recollection of the beginning and closing 
periods. Actually, this might provide an additional explanation to a paradox Gile 
has mentioned several times (e.g. Gile 1991: 198). Every interpreter has at times 
come out of the booth thinking “I’m afraid I wasn’t very good in this shift” and to 
her amazement been complimented by users. In fact all parties might be reacting, 
albeit differently, in accordance with the peak-end rule.
After a conference on Heidegger, a respondent assessing the interpreters she 
has listened to for one or more days might, for instance, complain about the qual-
ity of their work but her memory could be influenced by the fact that she did not 
understand a lot of the content. What Taleb (2008: 71) calls “narrative fallacy” 
could be operating here. “Memory is more of a self-serving dynamic revision 
machine: you remember the last time you remembered the event and, without 
realizing it, change the story of every subsequent remembrance” (his italics). Alterna-
tively, a colleague she admires and who speaks fluent German may praise the 
interpreters during a coffee break. As a result, whatever the respondent may have 
felt during the conference could well be overridden and she will voice her satis-
faction at the quality of the interpreting. 
The foregoing entails that such an innovative survey as the one conducted in 
1993 and 1994 by Moser, which included open-ended questions and differentiat-
ed between respondents who were listening to SI for the first time and what Mos-
er calls “old timers”, different age groups as well as genders, etc., may well provide 
useful and interesting information. Nonetheless, it cannot hope to measure ob-
jectively user satisfaction or quality of interpretation. After discussing why ques-
tionnaires are far from problem-free with respect to surveying user expectations 
and satisfaction, I would now like to focus on two fundamental criteria they make 
wide use of: fidelity to the original meaning and performance-related criteria.
4.  All you do is read in French... 
One of the first criteria in the list proposed to users in a questionnaire on the 
quality of interpreting/user satisfaction tends to be a variant of “sense consisten-
cy with the original message”, or “fidelity to the original meaning”, when it is not 
the very first parameter. 
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Diriker (2011: passim) demonstrated that, contrary to what was sometimes 
claimed earlier in the literature, “homogeneity” of the audience could not be 
taken for granted. Her interviews confirmed that some users listen exclusively 
to the interpreters while others shifted between the floor and their headset for 
various reasons. Furthermore, all interpreters know that somebody who is lis-
tening to SI for the first time will easily be “wowed“ while a frequent user, say in 
an international organisation, tends to be far more blasé. Their expectations are 
likely to be radically different.
What about users who do not speak the SL? Interpreters must seek to convey 
the feeling that they are trustworthy by producing a discourse that “sounds” log-
ical and inspires confidence and leaves users with the impression that nothing 
of importance has been omitted. In particular, when working for live TV an in-
terpreter cannot afford to hesitate or stumble. When discussing SI, Pym (2008: 
98) makes a relevant point: “For a mediator of any kind, once you lose trust, you 
lose everything.” In my opinion, this entails using appropriate terminology but 
also the “right” jargon given the subject matter, for instance. When interpret-
ing a presentation of financial statements for financial analysts, if the speaker is 
talking about IFRS-related issues, I would translate the French word “fusion” by 
“business combination.” The analysts would understand perfectly well if I used 
“merger”, but I hope that unconsciously they are getting the impression that I am 
familiar with IFRS jargon. Trust is the key word as shown by (Donovan 2002: 4) 
“participants often choose to listen to the interpretation even if they can “get by” 
without. They do so for reasons of convenience, but only as long as the interpreter 
inspires confidence” (my italics). 
We often have to cope with speakers whose sentences remind me of Jean-Luc 
Godard’s description of his own films: they have a beginning, a middle part and 
an end — but not necessarily in that order. In such a case, I will seek to “package” 
their utterances because I do not want the people listening to me to get the im-
pression that the somewhat incoherent ramblings they would otherwise hear 
are due to my incompetence. In the same way, one of my rules of thumb is that 
if the SL people in the audience burst out laughing my listeners should laugh 
as well. Recently, a speaker I was interpreting disagreed with someone in the 
room about whether their company had four or three building sites under way 
in the city of Troyes. To put an end to this rather inconsequential controversy, he 
quipped “allez, la guerre de Troyes n’aura pas lieu.” I translated this brilliant play-of-
words by “oh well, you might be right, I was never any good at counting past two.” 
As the English-speakers had just seen their French colleagues laugh heartily, they 
were in the right mood and giggled in turn. 
As said above, the “fidelity to the original meaning” criterion frequently tops 
simultaneous interpretation user questionnaires and nearly always is one of the 
first parameters in the list. It also usually receives the highest percentage in terms 
of satisfaction, although, as we have seen, its very position could be sending the 
message that the people who drafted the survey think it is the most important 
parameter and accordingly its very position may influence answers. This crite-
rion in fact will be frequently interpreted in accordance with a widespread “folk 
model”, described by Sperber and Wilson (2004: 37) in the following manner: 
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The speaker’s thoughts, encoded into an utterance, should be replicated in the hearer 
by a decoding process. The result of verbal communication should be an exact repro-
duction in the hearer of the thoughts the speaker intended to convey.
Consequently, the interpreter/translator ought to be invisible since s/he is mere-
ly decoding a message. A striking illustration of this viewpoint, and its impli-
cation that translating/interpreting is not all that difficult, is the potential cus-
tomer who once balked at the rate I charge for a translation and blurted out: “But 
all you do is read in French and type in English”. Language here consists in indi-
viduals exchanging messages that have one, and only one, meaning. “Correct” 
translating or interpreting is expected to consist in deciphering an individual’s 
message and faithfully as well as entirely replicating it in another language. A 
contrasting viewpoint is defended by Viaggio (2009: 10): “Every act of translation 
is, at the same time, an act of mediation. The translator’s transparency, no matter 
how desirable in certain contexts, is a myth […]”.
Let me give an example of how different points I have made so far can over-
lap. At a meeting of an international institution, the head of the French delega-
tion took the floor to voice his frustration because he felt a meaningless discus-
sion was meandering on and on. In fact, in my opinion, he thought a pretext 
was being used to attack indirectly a key ally of his. He curtly exclaimed “On ne 
va quand même pas passer des heures à enculer les mouches.” The other French dele-
gates laughed somewhat aggressively in agreement. My afore-mentioned rule of 
thumb kicked in and I said something like “Monsieur X has just complained that 
this issue has been debated far too long by using an obscene French saying that 
involves doing unmentionable things to flies.” The English-speaking delegates 
roared with laughter. In the meanwhile, clearly thinking he had gone too far, he 
looked up at me and added “I suppose you shouldn’t translate that”. I reverted to 
the first person and translated his second comment. The French joined in the 
general merriment as he ruefully sighed “Oh well, too late”. 
The whole mood of the meeting changed. A tense situation that threatened to 
deteriorate had been defused. If I had merely interpreted his outburst by saying 
something tame like “Could we drop this issue, it’s been discussed long enough?” 
in a monotonous tone, the English speakers would have noticed that he had spo-
ken in an abrupt manner and the other French delegates were laughing rather 
unpleasantly. Moreover, the fact that the Frenchman had requested me not to 
translate his initial statement also implied he regretted his aggressive tone. Note 
that I did not mediate consciously, I wish I could react that fast, I was thinking 
only of the need to get my listeners to laugh.
In a nutshell, the “folk model” discussed above focuses on language as com-
munication between individuals. Language is, by definition, a social activity and 
is “embedded” in culture and society. In 2011, I attended an event organised by the 
Société Française des Traducteurs. The guest speakers were Ros and Chloe Schwarz. 
Ros had just published a new translation of Saint-Exupéry’s The Little Prince. Chloe 
is Ros’s teenage daughter and had been used as a sounding board by her mother 
since the translation was aimed at people of her age. Ros brought up the thorny 
problem she had faced in translating Saint-Exupéry’s unsavoury phrase “rois 
nègres” and asked for suggestions. Regrettably, quite a few translators indignant-
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ly bleated at what they deemed was yet another case of “politically correct” think-
ing. I tried to point out that “rois nègres” was a common, if unpleasant, phrase in 
French at the time unlike “nigger kings” in English and such a rendering was 
thus utterly unacceptable. Ros actually liked my proposal, i.e. “tin pot kings”. 
Unfortunately, when she asked her daughter for her opinion, to my amazement, 
Chloe said she did not know the phrase. In other words, translating two French 
words gave rise to a political/cultural problem and an age-related one.
As Sperber and Wilson (2004: passim) point out, we can make hypotheses 
about the speaker’s intentions, and will often be right, but we can never be cer-
tain. Diriker (2011: 23) argues that: 
[…] receivers cannot access authorial intentions completely because each instance of 
language use contains more meanings, intentions and accents than its formulator 
may have intended and any single receiver can purport to have accessed. 
When we are working in a booth, we cannot always know when the speaker is 
making a veiled threat, referring to a scandalous situation, being sarcastic or pok-
ing fun at a past statement by someone else, and so forth. As a result, our version 
in the target language may very well distort or omit a crucial component of the 
message through no fault of our own since we can hardly know the background 
information (office politics, etc.) the speaker is referring to, or what people listen-
ing to us know, or their grasp of the TL. If I had been interpreting a debate about 
how to translate “les rois nègres” in The Little Prince, I would never have realised that 
most teenagers would not understand the phrase “tin pot kings” (like Chloe, my 
sixteen-year old daughter did not for instance). In a questionnaire handed out at 
the end of the debate, an English-speaking teenager may well have given me a 
negative rating since a key concept had been “badly translated.” 
5. ...If it ain’t got that swing 
It makes no difference
If it’s sweet or hot
Just give that rhythm
Everything you’ve got
It don’t mean a thing if it ain’t got that swing
It don’t mean a thing all you got to do is sing
(doo-ah) 
Duke Ellington & Irving Mills 
The category of performance-related criteria encompasses such features as 
rhythm, intonation, fluency, voice quality and accent. Blatant omissions, lengthy 
gaps in the interpreter’s flow of speech, audible hesitations and sentences that 
break off abruptly will undermine user trust. Rennert (2010:112-113) adds other 
flaws such as audible breathing, vowel and consonant lengthening, false starts, 
repairs, repetitions and speech rate to the reasons that lead the user to get the 
impression of lack of fluency. She draws the following conclusion: 
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[…] the results presented above suggest that there is a link between perceived fluency 
and perception of the interpreter’s accuracy, confirming previous studies that suggested 
that lower fluency may impact negatively on the perceived quality of an interpreta-
tion. [...] fluency cannot be ignored as a factor that influences audience perception.
In like manner, Collados Aís (2001: 109) has shown that “monotonous intonation 
hampers users’ retrieval of information” and apparently “has a negative effect on 
the evaluation of other quality criteria”. 
Following in her footsteps, Holub (2010: 117) states: “Analysis showed that 
monotony can have a negative impact on both comprehension and the assess-
ment of the interpreter’s performance.” Yao et al. published in 2012 a fascinating 
article based on Yao’s Ph. D. thesis. They scanned the brains of 18 participants us-
ing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they listened to audio 
clips of short stories containing direct or indirect speech quotations. Their main 
conclusion is that when the brain hears monotonously spoken words it feels 
should be more expressive, it creates an “inner voice” to drown out the offend-
ing speech and the brain simply ‘talks over’ the speech it hears with more vivid 
speech utterances of its own. Their experiment showed increased brain activity 
in the ‘voice-selective areas’ of the brain, i.e. certain areas of the auditory cortex. 
The brain merely needs to be informed that it is dealing with indirect speech to 
react in this manner. We can assume that listening to somebody with a monoto-
nous intonation for 30 minutes will result in a significant increase in brain activ-
ity, and this will be tiresome. For instance, a monotonous intonation means that 
the speaker’s voice does not drop at the end of an affirmative statement. Howev-
er, listening is a guessing game, we are constantly predicting what will be said 
next15, and the listener will expect the sentence to continue. We can easily see the 
detrimental impact on the user’s ability to understand the speaker. Collados Aís 
et al. (2007: 167) report that respondents associate monotonous intonation with 
the feeling of boredom for the listener. Furthermore, boredom reportedly leads 
respondents to feel tired and accordingly struggle to understand the content. 
Moreover, monotonous intonation gives the impression that the interpreter 
does not like his/her work and/or is not interested in what is being said. I would 
add that we may assume that the reason why respondents are attending an event 
is that they are usually interested in the subject and will unconsciously react neg-
atively to their impression that the interpreter finds it excruciatingly tedious. 
Collados Aís et al. (2007: 97) draw attention to their finding according to which 
respondents, after ranking content-related criteria above performance-related 
ones, as is usually the case in such surveys, clearly did not confirm this ranking in 
their actual assessment of interpreters’ performance. They note that users brought 
up such features as diffidence in the interpreter’s voice, shrill tone and monoto-
nous intonation when talking about content-related parameters (ibid: 104). The 
Pöchhacker and Zwischenberger (2010) survey corroborates this finding: 
15  A key point in Relevance Theory: “The hearer’s goal is to construct a hypothesis about 
the speaker’s meaning which satisfies the presumption of relevance conveyed by the 
utterance.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2004: 619)
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The criterion of intonation [...] has an appreciable impact on judgements of overall 
interpreting quality, even when listening for only one minute. Presumably, the im-
pact of monotonous intonation would be even more pronounced for a standard turn 
length of up to 30 minutes. 
An important conclusion is that the dichotomy between content- and presentation-re-
lated criteria is therefore far less clear-cut than widely believed. It is confirmed by Di-
riker (2011: passim) “users seem to perceive quality criteria as intertwined con-
structs with fuzzy borders”. Moreover, the way in which respondents claim they 
evaluate performance apparently does not match what actually occurs. 
In view of the foregoing, it is hardly surprising that Collados Aís (2002: 336) 
should draw the conclusion that “users not only desire but demand ... a certain 
degree of intrusion or active involvement on the part of the interpreter”. The in-
terpreter should assume the conscious role of professional communicator and 
go beyond the ‘ghost role’16. Granted, any comparison is apples to pears and mis-
leading. I chose a jazz standard as the title of this article because, to some extent, 
an interpreter is a jazz musician in comparison with, say, a translator — who is 
more of a classical musician. When jazz musicians are jamming in an inspired 
manner, despite possibly a few flaws, their overall performance and spontane-
ous creativity can sweep the audience off its feet. An interpreter who is “on fire” 
creates a somewhat similar rapport with his or her listeners. As Gile (1999c: 159 
for instance) has rightly emphasised “the high frequency of errors and omissions 
that can be observed in interpreting even when no particular technical or other 
difficulties can be identified in the source speech […]”. Users will sometimes pick 
up such flaws, yet nonetheless be satisfied with the interpreters’ performance 
just like spectators will overlook the shortcomings of a jamming session during 
a jazz concert because they are delighted by the experience as a whole. 
6.  The elephant in the room 
Although I have criticised them in this article, I would certainly not argue that 
user satisfaction questionnaires should be discarded, if only because they show 
that we interpreters are interested in user feedback. Surveys can also undeniably 
provide useful information as long as we keep in mind their intrinsic flaws. For 
example, Collados Aís (2001: 109) has recommended, on the basis of the surveys 
and follow-up interviews she has conducted, that students record themselves in-
terpreting and listen to how they sound in the light of the importance of deliv-
ery-related criteria. An interesting point is never discussed in the literature to my 
knowledge although it deserves looking into. Questionnaires ask respondents to 
assess the quality of interpreting, although we may safely assume that at the very 
least two interpreters were involved every time. The implicit and contentious 
16 In Collados Ais et al. this viewpoint is asserted even more decidedly: “Entre ellos, y a la 
vista de los resultados, el tema del papel del intérprete como elemento activo y deciso-
rio del proceso de interpretación y experto comunicador, viene a ocupar una posición 
esencial.” [2007: 223] 
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message is that interpreters provide homogenous quality. Getting respondents 
to assess individual interpreters in follow-up interviews and explain differences 
might actually be useful. In fact, we face the problem of deciding whether we 
want to carry out objective research or merely seek to defend our professional 
interests and therefore dodge such controversial issues.
This leads to another crucial issue: all the questionnaire-based quality re-
search in Interpreting Studies I know of breaches a fundamental marketing rule. 
Surveys poll existing users and most often do not consider former or potential 
users17. Questionnaires could be given to every participant in a conference or 
seminar to ask them whether they are going to use the interpretation and, if not, 
why? Some former users would presumably say this is because their grasp of the 
SL has sufficiently improved. But if some delegates have stopped using the ser-
vice of interpreters because their expectations were not met in the past, we are 
systematically skewing results. Moreover, once again, follow-up questions as to 
why they were not satisfied could reveal important information. The same point 
holds for people who have stopped recruiting interpreters. Is it only because of 
the expense? 
Interestingly, again to my knowledge, SI quality research never mentions 
sound technicians although corporations and institutions often employ them 
on a full-time basis. Their viewpoint may well have an impact, albeit an indirect 
one perhaps, on the decision to hire interpreters or not. It would be interesting 
to ask them and other people in administrative jobs at agencies, international 
institutions, Communication Departments and interpreters’ secretariats for in-
stance, whether they have any complaints about interpreters and why they pre-
fer to work with some interpreters and not others? 
Alain Bonzon, my late friend whom I met 25 years before becoming an in-
terpreter, worked for an international institution and frequently recruited in-
terpreters. I cannot remember him ever criticising interpreters for their work 
in the booth. On the other hand, when I read an article published by Viaggio in 
1996, “The Tribulations of a Chief Interpreter”, I could literally hear Alain’s voice as he 
indignantly described cases of freelance interpreters, in particular, behaving in 
a less than satisfactory manner — especially when reading Viaggio’s “caricature18” 
of interpreters (he does pointedly comment though: “As any caricature, my ap-
praisal above contains more than a grain of truth”). To be blunt, I have heard the 
words “divas” and “prima donnas” used in the same sentence as “interpreters” far 
too often. Most often, this holds for older colleagues, of my age in other words, 
who regret the loss of status interpreters have suffered from, like many other 
professions, and is hopefully less true for younger colleagues. 
In a nutshell, in contrast with the usual approach, the quality of the service 
provided by interpreters needs to be assessed in a holistic manner — not just their 
17  Peter Moser (1995) is an exception. 
18  “When you are a recruiter, it becomes immediately apparent that interpretation is an 
overpriced […] service provided somewhat grudgingly by notoriously testy specimens 
who count minutes the way Scrooge counted gold coins. […] [Furthermore, they] are 
complaining every time they do not have a document, or about a speaker going too fast 
or the slides being projected on the wrong wall […].”
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performance in the booth. Daniel Gile (1995b: 156) is a noteworthy exception 
since he also mentions the way interpreters dress, behave inside and outside the 
booth, interact with delegates, etc. I would like the hypothesis I have just out-
lined, i.e. too often interpreters have reacted negatively to the relative deteriora-
tion in our profession’s status by behaving in a demanding and/or exasperating 
manner, to be proven wrong. I would argue, however, that we cannot ignore such 
a possibility. 
7.  Completely uninteresting and trivial tautologies 
Shlesinger (1997: 129) highlights the fundamental flaw in the idea that accumu-
lating surveys, ultimately, will lead to “scientific” knowledge19. “However, as long 
as each questionnaire focuses on different variables, is formulated along differ-
ent lines, and is administered to different types of target audiences, comparisons 
of the results will be difficult”. We have seen above many other problems that 
would also rule out such a possibility, first and foremost the fact that the data 
from such questionnaires are unreliable since respondents’ answers cannot be 
presumed to shed light on their actual thoughts and emotions. Chiaro and No-
cella (2005: 172) voice a totally different viewpoint from mine.:
Over and over again we read that investigating quality in interpreting is not an easy 
task due to the huge number of variables involved [...] The general idea which comes 
across to the reader is that dealing with the enormous heterogeneity of circumstances 
in and around interpreting verges on the insurmountable.
They go on to argue: 
But is not apparent insuperability typical of scientific enquiry? Was Watson and 
Crick’s model easy to identify? And what of the excogitation of a formula that shows 
that distance and time are not absolute? And discovering penicillin? The list of seemingly 
intractable problems is endless. But is it not this very complexity that is what makes 
research fascinating and irresistible?
Apparent insuperability can also be absolute insuperability, as alchemists even-
tually discovered. Note also that Chiaro and Nocella mention only examples from 
so-called “hard” sciences. Such scientism goes hand in hand with another egre-
gious error. The successes enjoyed by research in physics are not accounted for 
by its methodology per se, but the fact that physics adapted its methodology to 
what it studies, in other words matter. Positivism claims, by contrast, that there 
is one, and only one, scientific methodology although it concedes that said meth-
odology may be adapted to social sciences. But, to paraphrase French economist 
Jacques Généreux, I can drop a stone from the top of the Eiffel Tower and calculate 
precisely where and when it will hit the ground or some unfortunate passer-by. 
If I throw the same stone at somebody, I cannot predict how they will react, or 
19  A viewpoint Thomas Kuhn described as “the textbook image of science”.
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in fact how I would react tomorrow if somebody threw a stone at me. As Passet 
(2010: 256) points out, the words “individual” and “atom” share the meaning of 
“beyond which no further division is possible”. Precisely, positivism postulates 
that an individual is to society what an atom is to the physical universe. The ab-
surdity of the battle cry of economics, i.e. ceteris paribus, consists in the fact that 
all other things are never equal when dealing with social events20. Individuals are 
not atoms unless you believe that there is no such thing as society. Carr (1960: 31) 
summed up the argument pithily: 
[...] take the dictum of J. S. Mill, the classical individualist: ‘Men are not, when brought 
together, converted into another kind of substance.’ Of course not. But the fallacy is 
to suppose that they existed, or had any kind of substance, before being ‘brought 
together’.
One example springs to mind: the important issue of the role played by inter-
preters during colonialism or even current wars such as Afghanistan or Iraq. At 
times, research in interpreting accordingly needs to consider cultural, social and 
economic factors. Assuming that such research is “unscientific” or less “serious” 
simply reflects a misunderstanding of what science really means.
We cannot accept the “diktats” of the ATSC and their definition of science, as 
otherwise Interpreting Research will be doomed to the fate Werner Heisenberg, 
Nobel laureate for the creation of quantum mechanics, described in Physics and 
Beyond: 
The positivists have a simple solution: the world must be divided into that which we 
can say clearly and the rest, which we had better pass over in silence. But can anyone 
conceive of a more pointless philosophy, seeing that what we can say clearly amounts 
to next to nothing? If we omitted all that is unclear we would probably be left with 
completely uninteresting and trivial tautologies. (1971: 213) 
They would presumably include attempts to define quality21 “objectively” and de-
bates about the statistical treatment of data generated by respondents’ answers 
to questionnaires. 
To conclude, I would like to emphasize I am not criticising any kind of re-
search per se. I am simply arguing that the stifling influence of positivism must 
be challenged. Asserting that one’s approach is hard-headed and scientific while 
the so-called Liberal Arts Paradigm is merely woolly-headedness may be grati-
fying, but bold statements tantamount to dismissing the “Humanities” in fact 
imply that the proponents of such a viewpoint are somehow entitled to call into 
question the “intellectual rigour” of fellow researchers who have studied such 
subjects as philosophy. In fact, first and foremost, we need to move beyond C.P. 
Snow’s “Two Cultures” mindset. 
20  Indeed mainstream economics epitomises all the detrimental consequences of 
“physics envy”.
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